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Mr. Balto: I have about 15 questions to ask the panel, but I move quick-
ly. Tom Hoenig paid for all of us to come out here, and he said in his open-
ing remarks that the interchange fee was a price. Do any of you disagree with
that? Nobody disagrees with that; everybody agrees interchange is a price.
Second, let’s go to the issue of transparency. Somebody asked about
transparency. Transparency is part of Bernhard Friess’ order. Bernhard, why
is transparency part of the order and how do you see it as being important
to the functioning of the market?
Mr. Friess: We get a lot of feedback from customers in the acquiring mar-
ket for merchants—even the very large merchants—who tell us that they
simply do not know what interchange fees are. They have many questions.
How high are they? How are they set? What are the components of inter-
change fees? So it seems to us that in a market in which the customer side
has a severe deficiency of information, part of a remedy or part of a solution
could be to make that information available. That is why we approached the
networks to make their interchange fees more transparent, and I say this is
something that, as was mentioned previously, could apply even beyond inter-
change fees. It could apply to other network rules that have an effect on the
market, affect the way that competition is taking place.
Mr. Balto:To Renata Hesse, how do you determine a relevant market in
the antitrust case?
Ms. Hesse: We use the hypothetical monopolist test, which is a lot of jar-
gon for you all. Basically, we look at the price and we look in the context
of whoever the players are in the marketplace to figure out who is con-
straining the ability of either the parties that are merging or the party or
Interchange Fees: Antitrust and
Regulatory Perspectives 
General Discussion
Chair: David A. Balto
 parties that are engaging in allegedly unlawful conduct. We try to figure
out whatever realistic constraints exist out in the marketplace on those
entities’ ability to raise price or reduce output.
Mr. Balto: In the cases the Department of Justice (DOJ) has brought,
how has the interchange fee played a role in the analysis of market power?
Ms. Hesse: In the analysis of market power, we generally look at inter-
change as a price, and we apply what is called the SSNIP test (which again
is a little bit more jargon than anybody needs) to interchange. In the con-
text of the First Data case, we applied it to the switch fee that the merchant
pays to the network. We think of it as a price and we look at whether or
not the merging parties, or, in the U.S. v. Visa case, whether Visa and
MasterCard, will have the ability to raise that price by a small but signifi-
cant nontransitory amount.
Mr. Balto: We’ve heard a lot about two-sided markets. I’d like John
Vickers to answer. How does the two-sided aspect of the market affect your
analysis and your decision whether or not to bring in an enforcement action?
Mr. Vickers: Well, on the question of bringing in enforcement actions,
again let me stress the difference with the U.S. case where the DOJ, or pri-
vate plaintiffs or whoever, will bring a case to court. Broadly (not every-
where in Europe, but generally), an agency takes a decision which poten-
tially is subject to very thorough and rigorous appeal from either side.
There is a threshold we need to cross before we begin an investigation,
which is that of reasonable grounds to suspect. That is a low hurdle and has
to do with suspicion, which is some way short of belief. Bringing an
enforcement action needs to be seen in that context. Some are own-initia-
tive. Some are prompted by complainants. Some, in the old regime, were
notifications, as was the MasterCard matter originally.
As to whether it is a two-sided market, clearly one takes into account the
relevant facts and the economics of the situation. I am not sure how that
plays into this question of whether you pursue a case or not.
Mr. Balto: The panelists in the Industry Panel talked about the impor-
tance of looking at both sides of the market. In your evaluation, is that part
of the equation?
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 Mr. Vickers: Yes, sure. You want to get a good understanding of the
whole picture, so of course you do look at both sides. As Michael Katz was
saying—this is a sort of nerdy economist point—there are also some of the
Ramsey pricing issues you can get in one-sided, multiproduct markets too.
Of course, you look at all the facts in the round and in the light of the
robust economic principles too.
Mr. Balto: Renata, same question.
Ms. Hesse: We think the two-sided nature of the markets is an impor-
tant thing to consider. If you read the Visa decision, the judge in that case
clearly looked at both sides of the market. She looked at the issuer side and
at the merchant side. We also did that in the First Data case, although we
ultimately found that the side of the market that was most likely to suffer
substantial harm was the merchant side. So the focus of our case was on
the merchant side of that market. It is an important part of the analysis and
important not to ignore it. One could arguably say that in the credit card
industry, the market is a little bit less two-sided, since the issuers are part
of the consortium that make up the network. But, again, in the Visa case,
we looked at it as a two-sided market and analyzed it as a two-sided mar-
ket also.
Mr. Balto: Renata, John had talked about shifting burdens of proof. We had
heard that before. Is the U.S. law similar to the law in the United Kingdom
and the European Commission in terms of shifting burdens of proof?
Ms. Hesse: Yes, generally I like to think of these things in the most sim-
plistic way possible. I think, particularly in a Section 2 case, which is a
monopolization case, you are looking at essentially making a cost-benefit
analysis. So we have the burden of proving that there is conduct ongoing
that has a likelihood of harming competition.
Then the defendant in the case has the ability to come forward and give
a procompetitive justification for that conduct. If that procompetitive jus-
tification is compelling, the court will decide for the defendant. There real-
ly are two sides to the case, and the defendants in our Section 2 cases have
a very good opportunity to put forward their views and beliefs about why
the transaction or the conduct is actually good for the market instead of
harmful to the market.
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If you read the Microsoft decision, you will see there are claims that were
made in the Microsoft case, in which we carried our initial burden, but
Microsoft gave a procompetitive justification for the conduct, and the
court ultimately permitted that conduct. It is not a forgone conclusion.
Again, I encourage people who are appearing in front of us or are engaged
in cases with us to try to explain to us what the procompetitive benefits are,
because we absolutely are not interested in either killing mergers or chal-
lenging conduct that is good for the marketplace.
Mr. Balto: Let’s spend a few minutes talking about issues involving rem-
edy. David, in the Interac case, which involved a monopoly network, in
which the Canadian Competition Tribunal seemed to find some problems
with the actions of the monopoly debit card network, rather than taking a
structural relief, you did other things. Why did you do things short of
structural relief?
Mr. Teal: In terms of remedies, most antitrust agencies consider the facts
they are presented with and also the nature of the issue being considered.
In a merger situation, where it is predictive and you are trying to anticipate
problems, structural remedy is an easy, clean solution that addresses the
problem in advance. When you are looking at what we term as an “abuse
of dominant position” case, having a dominant position is not necessarily
a problem. It is if you’re engaged in practices that abuse that position and
somehow harm market entry. In abuse cases, you are more likely to see a
behavioral-type remedy.
With the Interac order, we are looking at a situation where we had a
national network. We realized there were certain significant efficiencies
available through the national network. If we split the national network,
would we have two competing systems that were able to achieve the
economies of scale that the single system could? In balancing our approach
in terms of the remedies that were arrived at—and again, it was a consent
order—we felt that a behavioral approach in this circumstance would be
the more beneficial choice. It would protect the efficiencies in the system,
but also open the system to allow for intrasystem competition.
Mr. Balto: Why don’t we turn things over to the audience? Let’s start off
with David Evans.
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conferences is the possibility of getting a good understanding of where the
areas of agreement are and where the areas of disagreement are. I’d like to
ask a question to the panel to see whether I could try to narrow down
where we agree and where some of the disagreement is.
As I listen to the panelists and some of the other speeches, the sense I get
is that there is agreement from the regulators and the competition authori-
ties that one of the things that people really aren’t interested in, in terms of
an intervention in this industry, is no interchange fee. That is not something
that people are talking about or even think is a sensible notion.
The second thing is that, at least for these large systems, the bilateral setting
of interchange fees between the thousands of issuers is not something that,
from a regulatory standpoint, anyone is thinking of as a possible intervention.
Therefore, the interest in policy debate is how the interchange fee should
be set and at what level.
Assuming that the issue is what the interchange fee should be set at,
should it be set at zero from your point of view? Or should it be set at some
cost-based level from your standpoint? Also, what would the theory be on
the U.S. antitrust law? Maybe, Renata, you are the relevant person to
answer this: What would the antitrust theory be that Visa or MasterCard
is a cartel, but the price should be fixed at zero or some cost-based level?
Ms. Hesse: I am probably not going to give a very satisfactory answer to
your second question. Let me start with your first one about interchange
and whether or not it should be set at zero.
There is a general view on our part that the banks—the issuers—are pro-
viding a service for which they should be paid, whether you call that pay-
ment interchange or something else. The question is how much should
they be paid for it? I think you are right that the policy question is the
question of the amount. Again, these are my views. It may not be what the
Assistant Attorney General believes, but I am telling you what I think
about them.
I did want to make one comment about your bilateral negotiation point.
I think that is sort of an open question. One of the things that nobody has
looked at very hard is whether the collective nature of the card associations
is the only way that these prices can be set without there being tremendous
chaos in the marketplace, which is the specter that the bilateral negotiation
situation presents. That is an interesting question and one that somebody
could look at and try to figure out the answer. But, if we ever were to look
at the question of whether or not the collective setting of interchange by
 the associations is somehow a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
that is going to be a question that we will need to answer. The theory
would be a Section 1 theory of collective negotiation among competitors.
Mr. Friess: Can I answer that too? To your first question, there are, of
course, payment networks, in Europe at least, that do operate apparently
without the interchange fee and have reached a very high market penetra-
tion without it. And there are systems which work on the basis of bilater-
al fee setting. We are not saying that multilateral interchange fees are inher-
ent to such a system, but what we are saying and what we are accepting is
that if a network decides to have them, we can see the efficiencies that you
gain from that. We recognize these efficiencies as part of the European law,
article 81, paragraph 3, rule-of-reason approach where we weigh the effi-
ciencies with benefits to consumers.
Mr. Constantine: Renata, I have a question for you. In your reference to
the Second Circuit opinion in the U.S. case, I am sure you noted that the
Second Circuit opinion in the merchants’ case said that the U.S. case had
piggybacked upon the In re Visa Check case. I have a question about the
two matters you referenced—the U.S. case and the First Data challenge.
You defined a market as PIN debit there. You also said that you see cred-
it and debit as being very different. I think logically, that would say that
signature debit is also a separate market. One of the results of the U.S. case
was to reestablish dual issuance of signature debit by both Visa and
MasterCard. Do you consider that to be a procompetitive outcome if sig-
nature debit is a market?
Ms. Hesse: It is hard for me to speculate about that, Lloyd.
Mr. Constantine: That is not speculation. That has come into being as
a result of the remedy in your case.
Ms. Hesse: As a result of the remedy in the First Data case?
Mr. Constantine: No, as a result of the remedy in the U.S. v. Visa and
MasterCard case. Prior to your case, there was a nonduality rule with
respect to signature debit. As a result of the U.S. case, now any bank in
the country can issue both Visa and MasterCard signature debit. Since
you’ve taken the position that signature debit is a market and they are the
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 only two competitors in that market, do you consider the end of 
nonduality or the establishment of duality in signature debit to be a 
procompetitive outcome?
Ms. Hesse: I think the procompetitive outcome of that case is that banks
are free now to issue signature debit cards for not only Visa and
MasterCard, but also for American Express and Discover. I expect with the
acquisition of Pulse by Discover that you are actually going to see that hap-
pen, perhaps a little bit faster with Discover than with American Express.
You are probably not going to end up with a world where there are only
two signature debit networks. I think that is a good thing.
Mr. Schmalensee: I’d like to give the panel an opportunity to respond to
an issue that Noah Hanft raised in his keynote address. Suppose the world
had turned out differently. Diners Club hadn’t stumbled. The bank associa-
tions did stumble. We would have a world in which the dominant form was
a  three-party system. American Express, say, would take the place of Visa
internationally. It had franchise agreements with banks and it gave banks
such-and-such for issuing and charged acquiring banks such-and-such a per-
centage of the transaction. Would we be here? Would you have an interest?
If the dominant form was three-party, not four-party, would there be a com-
petition policy issue?
Mr. Friess: My answer is that I don’t know. I don’t want to speculate
about what would be if. By the way, the world has turned out differently
in Europe. For example, we have multiple debit networks of different sys-
tems, quite apart from Visa and MasterCard. We have the issue. It is a lit-
tle bit the endgame. Will they prevail? Will they remain with an efficient,
low-cost approach or will it move to a more Visa-MasterCard-style shape
of the industry?
More directly to your question, if there are systems that have market
power in whatever form (we have not really looked into that), maybe there
is a better antitrust issue there. But that is pure speculation. At the
moment, we have the industry as it is.
Mr. Vickers: The question “Would we be here?” is one for Tom Hoenig
really. On the hypotheticals that Dick Schmalensee talks about, it is a ques-
tion of facts and law at the European community level and in the member
states—and since May of last year, all the member states don’t just have an
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You have, first, the question of whether arrangements of the kind you
describe nevertheless came within the bit of law that deals with agreements,
because there would be a number of agreements as a part of a system. They
might deal with price. It all depends on the facts.
There have been some cases in quite different sectors to do with what an
agreement is in settings where it is very fact-dependent. It might or might
not come within that, depending upon how much market power there was.
There is also provision of law dealing with a dominant position. So it
might or might not come within that, again depending upon the facts.
Other than giving a hasty summary of bits of competition law textbooks,
I don’t know what more to say.
Mr. Trifilidis:Historic consideration aside, as an antitrust authority, I
must evaluate the legality of Visa and MasterCard’s current bank agree-
ments and network rules. If American Express had become the dominant
player, then I would need to determine if American Express, not Visa and
MasterCard, was abusing its dominant position. In this manner, the ques-
tion for the antitrust authority is the same.
I would like to ask the panelists if they think the interchange fees could
be a bigger problem for the antitrust reason, for all other rules that there
are in the network, such as no-surcharge, duality membership, honor-all-
cards, and so on.
Mr. Friess: It is difficult to say. I wouldn’t call it a big problem. I think
that our approach to interchange fees is to look at whether they have dis-
torting effects on competition, whether they have groups of customers who
do not benefit from as much competition as they could. If that is the case,
we seek to address the issue. That can be because of an interchange fee
arrangement, or it can be because of rules in these payment networks.
Mr. Balto: I have a question for Renata. We have heard a lot about com-
petition for card issuers in terms of higher interchange fees. Are inter-
change fees ever the source of competition between merchants? That gives
you a chance to say a little more about the First Data-Concord case.
Ms. Hesse: I think the combined merchant discount, which is inter-
change and switch, certainly is a matter that the merchant attempts to
negotiate with the networks on the PIN debit side at least. I am sure it is
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 true in the other cases, but since you wanted me to focus on the First Data
case, I’ll say that we did see substantial evidence that merchants used a vari-
ety of tools to try to negotiate down the merchant discount.
As Bernhard mentioned about transparency, one of the really interesting
things about that case that we learned is there is a pretty large amount of
information out there for merchants to use. Their processors keep a lot of
data about the costs of routing transactions. Some of them do regularly,
very stringently manage how they route transactions over the least costly
network, which reduces the fees they pay for PIN debit transactions.
Obviously the network then has to figure out how to balance the inter-
change demanded by the issuer with the merchant side. There is evidence, at
least, that the merchants do have some power. The more networks they have
to deal with and the more choice they have for PIN debit networks, the
greater power they have to choose not only the least costly route, but also to
threaten to drop small networks that are trying to raise prices to them.
Mr. Katz: Just one thing. Although we should judge everybody’s state-
ments by the merits of the statements, I think it is unfortunate that the
conference did not require people to disclose their involvement in things
more. I will say, because I have a question for Renata, that I was the gov-
ernment’s expert economist testifying in U.S. v. Visa, and I worked and
appeared in court for First Data, on the other side of the government in
First Data-Concord.
The question I have for Renata is a factual question. I was puzzled by
your response to Lloyd. Are you saying that it is your reading of the judge’s
decision in the U.S. case that it mandates that Visa and MasterCard go to
duality and that they get rid of their exclusivity rules in debit?
And the second question is are you aware of any banks that in fact do
issue Visa and MasterCard signature debits simultaneously?
Ms. Hesse: The short answer to that question, along the line of
McLaughlin, is no and no. I was merely suggesting that even if it were true,
the purpose of the case and the point of the case were to put two more
competitors into that marketplace. That is a procompetitive, good thing.
Mr. Negrín: I have a question for John Vickers. In your paper, you
describe a possible way of intervening and that is through cost regulation.
The problem there is what kind of costs you would introduce, because in
the European Commission, they authorize different costs than what you
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lem of whose costs you would use—those of the most efficient bank or
those of the average bank.
The other issue I see is that cost regulation has lots of problems in other
industries that would be the same in this industry. How are you planning
on dealing with that?
Mr. Vickers: There is a little bit in my paper about it, if you like a regu-
latory approach as distinct from a competition law approach. I think cost
considerations, despite all that is in the newly emerging literature on two-
sided markets, are very important in the competition law assessment as well,
and indeed, they were featured in the European Commission proceedings
that Bernhard described.
In a number of places at a number of times, those defending existing
arrangements themselves have relied heavily on arguments to do with dif-
ferent cost categories and why whichever cost is appropriate. In some con-
texts, that has been part of the defense of the arrangements too. The prin-
cipal distinction I was drawing in the paper was between costs of the pay-
ments service—the transaction completion service, if you like—and other
costs. Of course, for an issuer, there are all sorts of other costs to do with
the extension of credit, credit risk, interest-free period, etc., which seem to
be another kind of cost. The broad question of principle is whether we
should focus, at least when setting some benchmarks for where burdens of
proof might shift, on the costs relating to the payments services.
Credit has been, if you like, one of the non-barking dogs at this confer-
ence. There has been very little discussion about the extension of credit. Of
course, credit cards are a means of payment that leads directly to a particu-
lar form of debt for the multitudes who don’t pay off their accounts in full.
Maybe in the next session this may be of interest to central banks. That is
another piece of the equation that might have received a little bit more dis-
cussion. That cost-based benchmark principle is what I was alluding to in
the paper. I understand that cost regulation, in the utility sense, can be a
laborious and detailed business.
There was an earlier question which I didn’t have a chance to respond to
on remedies. In general, when it is a case where the question is an anticom-
petitive agreement, then the remedy is that the unlawful bits of the agree-
ments—or the bits which fall on the wrong side of exemptability—are
changed. That is the remedy. Whether you want to call that regulation or
not is one of those semantic questions.
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 Ms. Posner: This is a question for Renata, but perhaps other panelists as
well. Earlier we heard analysis of two-sided markets. One of the conclusions
was that, without better theory and data, we could not decisively explain or
predict the direction of interchange rates or merchant pricing in the United
States. Alan Frankel articulated a hypothesis, one that some of the other
speakers seem to support. The hypothesis is that in the United States, we are
experiencing at present a race to monopoly, where the DOJ case has, in
effect, put pressure on Visa and MasterCard to raise their interchange fees
to prevent banks from defecting to the American Express network, which
publicly advertises premium economics for would-be bank partners.
My question to you, Renata: Is the DOJ’s intervention done if one can
at least plausibly consider this race-to-the-monopoly hypothesis?
Ms. Hesse: I am trying to think how to answer that question. I think the
DOJ’s intervention is done in the context of the case that we brought,
which was a case alleging that these card associations had violated the
Sherman Act. Were we to look at interchange again, it would have to be at
least in a different context or with different facts about why something that
is happening with interchange constitutes an antitrust violation. It’s unde-
niable that we believe that concentration at any part of this two-sided mar-
ket—at the network level, at the bank level, or at the issuer level—has the
potential to distort prices in a way that is not good for consumers. That is
something that we review every time we look at something in these mar-
kets. We are going to continue to do that.
Whether or not there is something here that suggests that the rising
interchange rates in the United States are the result of anticompetitive con-
duct is an open question. If there are people out there who believe they
have evidence or a good theory for why they think that is the case, then
obviously we are happy to hear from them. We will continue to look at it,
as I said, as things come to us. It is hard for me to speculate about how that
is going to turn out.
There’s one other thing I want to point out about the Visa case. I know
there are a lot of merchants who think having American Express and more
competitors in the market is going to cause interchange to go up as the dif-
ferent networks compete for issuers, but there was a lot of evidence in the
Visa case about how keeping AmEx and Discover out of the market actu-
ally inhibited innovation. And there were innovations in the card market
that were occurring in foreign countries that weren’t occurring in the
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States, because of the lack of competition. That is a really important thing
people need to remember, because there are positives to that competition.
I am not going to take a position here on whether they balance out what
may be potential negatives in terms of the interchange going up, but there
are certainly positives to that competition in terms of the products and
services that cardholders can get.
Mr. Orenbuch: Following up on that question, did you consider the
probability that interchange would rise as a result of that case? How much
weight did that carry versus the theory of suppressed innovation when you
decided to bring the case?
Ms. Hesse: I think part of the striking thing about the case for us was that
it presented a situation where there was a duopoly of bank-issued credit
cards that was being maintained by exclusionary rules in the card associa-
tions. That was really the thing that drove the case. The exclusionary rules
appeared to be having negative effects on the marketplace, including loss of
innovation and less competition for issuers. It is a situation where, as I said
before, it is going to be very hard for us to look at something that appears
to create a duopoly structure, being maintained by exclusionary rules, where
we thought there was substantial evidence that those rules harmed compe-
tition. On balance, what is the procompetitive reason for that happening?
The efficiency justifications that the card associations provided in the case
didn’t hold up very well, and the court ultimately rejected them. I know that
is not a direct answer to your question, but really the thing that we were
striving for was ending exclusionary conduct that was resulting in a duop-
oly in bank-issued credit cards.
Mr. Bouchard: Let’s presume for a moment that merchants got together
and created a network involving the private-label cards. As probably most
of us know, the private-label cards are controlled by three players (80 or 90
percent of the market). If we decided that zero interchange was what we
wanted to have between us and decided that because the other card net-
works were priced higher we would not accept them, would that be a regu-
latory issue?
Secondly, let’s go down the road. We only accept private-label cards, and
the networks or the banks want to have their cards accepted and they are
willing to come in at zero interchange or we require them to come in at
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 zero interchange. Is that us balancing the system? Or would you consider
that merchants’ price fixing?
Ms. Hesse: I was going to say that I would advise you to get a good
antitrust lawyer. I am not going to sit here and suggest there is not a way
that the merchants could not get together and form their own payment
network and do that in a way that would not violate the antitrust laws. I
cannot sit here and speculate about how that could be done. I think it
could probably be done in a way that did not violate the antitrust laws. I
would, as Lloyd just said, advise you to seek a business review letter before
you did it. It is collective action, and I understand the point, which is that
you think it is collective action on the other side. I don’t know how to
answer that other than to say that we have not seen a case to bring on the
collective action side.
I don’t know the answers to, for example, the efficiency question. That
is, is the only way that the provision of the card services can happen is to
have this collective action on the network side? That is a question that has
not been answered, and I don’t know if anybody has looked hard at it.
Answering that question is going to be a critical part to finding out the
ultimate answer of whether or not this particular joint venture is function-
ing in a way that violates the antitrust laws.
Ms. Hanna: A follow-up: Can you name any other industry in which a
coalition of financial institutions gets together, makes the rules, enforces
the rules, and sets the fees that will be applied to everyone?
Ms. Hesse: Off the top of my head, I can’t, but I wouldn’t hold me to
that answer, in the sense that there might be. The point that you have to
look at is that there is a joint venture that has been formed, that has creat-
ed a new product (new at the time it was formed), and that it is providing
to people. The ultimate question is whether or not the conduct that it is
engaging in, in its joint venture context, is ancillary or necessary for the
joint venture to be able to provide the product. Sitting here today, I don’t
know the answer to that question, but that is the question.
Mr. Balto: Let me interpose one question. If something is reasonably
necessary at the origins of the joint venture—because there are a lot of
speakers who have made points about Visa and MasterCard at their ori-
gins—how does that affect the analysis maybe 10 or 15 years later?
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Mr. Floum: I wanted to return to something that I thought I heard Sir
John Vickers say, which I think is quite important. I thought I heard you
say that, when you are talking about cost-based formulas, what you are
concerned with is regulation of utilities. When you are talking about com-
petition law and the issues that competition authorities ought to be look-
ing at, and indeed, if you are talking about litigation, the analysis is
whether there is a difference in the price that is charged and what would
occur absent any kind of market dysfunction, what the demand curves
would look like, and what the value of the products and services offered is.
My question for the panel is does anyone believe that the card associations
are utilities? Given the kind of dynamic change that we’ve seen, the tremen-
dously dynamic environment in payments, the kind of innovation that it
has brought, the data security issues which are paramount, the new prod-
ucts that are introduced every day, and absent thinking of the associations
as fungible utilities, is there any role for cost-based thinking? Isn’t the analy-
sis really value? Isn’t the question whether the value that is brought to con-
sumers and merchants appropriate and out of sync? And where is the role
of any kind of cost-based calculation absent a finding or a thinking that
what we are is simply a fungible utility?
Mr. Vickers: I repeat that a number of defenses of existing arrangements
that I am aware of have been very cost-based, so that is not a question just for
agencies. I was drawing the distinction between the competition law
approach, where you have the question, “Is it appreciably anticompetitive?” If
so, with the burden shifting, are the exemption tests passed? And, as a bench-
mark for looking at that question, my paper talks about a more-than-all-the-
costs standard. I wasn’t saying that these payments systems are just like utili-
ties; I wasn’t seeking to draw that point at all. A core economic point in all
this—and it goes back to the very interesting question we had a moment
ago—is that when associations are of a certain importance, there is this issue
of being a must-have product for a wide range of retailers. That is where the
issues of market power arise. Referring to your point about value, that is where
the normal economics of measuring value or relying on the market to do that
break down, because—I am talking in theory here—the average merchant
benefit of card acceptance can be way lower than the marginal benefit or the
fee. That is one place where the potential economic distortion arises.
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 What I liked about the earlier question was a thought experiment I had
gone through (which is perhaps the ultra free markets approach), which is
to say, “Let’s have an association on the other side too.” You would have
the association of merchants, and you get in a room with card associations
and haggle.
Similar to what Renata said about the position that might occur under
U.S. antitrust law, under European law—I speak of domestic as well as
community-wide law—such an association of retailers would be extremely
well-advised to get legal advice before contemplating entering into any
such arrangement. But that underlies the asymmetry. It is not one that
matters for a card that isn’t a must-have or approaching a must-have. The
question there doesn’t arise. But when it is in that category, there is a very
serious public policy question about the potential for distortion between
different means of payments. The race-to-monopoly point also came up
earlier, if you do have a situation where on the facts these are in effect
must-have networks and with the flow of loyalty payments and so on. Ian
McFarlane from the Reserve Bank of Australia has likened it in some ways
to the ancient Gresham’s law. The consumer is king and will use the means
of payment that is the most rewarding for the consumer, without regard to
the underlying efficiency benefits of the system. I am talking about the
potential for harm here. It is a very serious potential, and if it is realized, it
could be a very serious harm.
Mr. Friess: I want to add two points to that. The first point is that the
cost-based approach which we took in 2002 was taken as a proxy. I am not
saying this is the eternal truth or something that is cast in stone forever
and, I guess, partly arose and led by some of the various explanations that
the networks themselves stated about the nature of interchange fees. The
networks partly told us that interchange fees are tools to shift costs, to
reimburse for costs, within a system.
My second point is more of a question. If you were to abandon that
approach and go more toward understanding interchange fees as a kind of
balancing tool that helps internalize externalities, then I think it leads us
back to the question of what really are the two-sided aspects of the market?
Certainly what is a two-sided market is the payment function, but, of
course, we need to be aware that a number of other products or services are
being bundled into a credit card product and consumer credit.
We saw the presentation of the Visa representative about travel 
insurance. I wonder whether these are really products that are being sold
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is an activity of a one-sided market; setting consumer credit is a one-sided
market. If you go down that road, you will have many questions to answer,
and I am not entirely sure that the existing economic models fully take this
diverse aspect of the nature of the product into account. But I haven’t an
answer to that. It is a question that I am asking myself.
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